

Message Text

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22

ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 OMB-01 ARA-06 ACDA-05

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O 031100Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6781

INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

AMCON CAPETWON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T KINSHASA 1874

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CG AO

SUBJ: MOBUTU-NETO ACCOMODATION: A REVIEW OF MOTIVES AND RESULTS

1. SUMMARY: THE RECENT "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NETO AND MOBUTU AT BRAZZAVILLE ON FEB 28 WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE REFLECTION OF THE FACT THAT NETO HAD WON IN ANGOLA. THE IMPETUS FOR THIS AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME WAS BASED UPON THE NEED OF BOTH PARTIES FOR PEACE ALONG THE FRONTIER--NETO BECAUSE HE WANTS TO FREE UP THE SOVIET/CUBAN FORCES FOR USE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICANS AND

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UNITA AND MOBUTU BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS AND NEEDS TO DEVOTE

HIS ENERGIES TO ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. NETO'S NEED TO NEUTRALIZE THE FNLA AND SECURE HIS NORTHERN AND EASTERN FRONTS WAS URGENT ENOUGH THAT HE MADE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ACCOMMODATION, READILY AGREED TO GUARANTEE ZAIRE'S HISTORICAL AND KEY INTERESTS AND ACCEPTED MOBUTU'S NORMALIZATION-WITHOUT-RECOGNITION FORMULA. MOBUTU GOT THE FIG LEAF HE NEEDS NOW AND NETO GOT TACIT RECOGNITION THAT HE IS MASTER IN ANGOLA, AND HE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR LEGITIMIZING THE ORIGINAL SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION. END SUMMARY.

2. THE ESSENTIAL BASIS FOR THE "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MPLA AND THE GOZ AT BRAZZAVILLE LAST WEEKEND LIES IN THE FACT THAT BOTH MOBUTU AND NETO NEED PEACE ALONG THEIR COMMON FRONTIER AND IN CABINDA:
--NETO BECAUSE HE WANTS TO FREE UP THE CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET EQUIPMENT FOR AN ALL-OUT PUSH AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICANS INSIDE ANGOLA AND AGAINST REMAINING POCKETS OF UNITA RESISTENCE. BEYOND THAT THE MPLA MAY USE THE SOVIET/CUBANS TO PROSECUTE THE LIBERATION OF NAMIBIA AND PERHAPS RHODESIA. SUCH A STRATEGY WOULD NOT LEAST "LEGITIMIZE" THE ORIGINAL SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA.
--MOBUTU BECAUSE HE HAS TO GET ON WITH HIS ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM, WHICH WILL REQUIRE ALL OF ZAIRE'S ENERGIES, BECAUSE HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE BALANCE OF POWER HAS SHIFTED AGAINST HIM AND BECAUSE HE SEES LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS--AND GREAT RISK--IN SUPPORTING GUERRILLA ACTION BY FNLA/UNITA.

3. OF THE TWO, NETO'S PERCEIVED NEED FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WAS MORE URGENT, AND THIS WAS REFLECTED BY THE *** (7K\$**G***J*F*****.;**EW7** *4*C***9:K****)***PDQ*RE*J*:
*HC/*N***4*****BD8*****2/*6G*?*F*****D***I
C;(*3**1**2***** (MJMOVED; A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE FNLA AND UNITA REPS; AND THE RETURN OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE TO ANGOLA. THIS LAST POINT WAS PARTIALLY A CODE WORK FOR FNLA FORCES IN ZAIRE AND FOR THE KATANGANS IN ANGOLA. THE MPLA POLITICAL BUREAU REPLIED PUBLICLY TO MOBUTU'S POINTS ON FEB 18 IN A BASICALLY CONCILIATORY FASHION--BUT HUNG TOUGH ON THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION, INSISTING THAT FNLA AND UNITA WERE BANNED AS ORGANIZATION AND CALLED INSTEAD FOR THE RE-INTEGRATION OF EX-FNLA/UNITA MILITANTS AND "HONEST LEADERS" (NOT HOLDEN OR SAVIMBI) INTO THE MPLA FOLD. THEN BEGAN THE SERIES OF SECRET CONTACTS LEADING TO THE BRAZZAVILLE ACCORD.

6. HOW DID MOBUTU FARE? THE MPLA AGREED TO GUARANTEE TRANSIT OVER THE BENGUELA AND OUT THROUGH MATADI AND ALSO TO RE-DRAFT IN JOINT COMMISSION THE TREATIES GOVERNING THESE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTES. THE MPLA SAID THEY WOULD NOT FORCE THE KATANGAN GENDARMES TO RETURN TO ZAIRE, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PERMIT THE REPATRIATION OF THOSE WHO WISHED TO RETURN. FOR THOSE GENDARMES WHO STAY IN ANGOLA, NETO PROMISED TO SEE TO IT THAT THEY POSED NO THREAT TO ZAIRE. THE DETAILS ON HOW THIS LAST POINT WOULD BE WORKED OUT WAS REFERRED TO THE JOINT COMMISSION, BUT BOTH SIDES BELIEVE IT CAN BE DONE. ON THESE TWO POINTS, THEN, MOBUTU GOT WHAT HE WANTED.

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7. NETO ALSO GUARANTEED THAT THE SOVIET/CUBAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST ZAIRE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO THEIR REMOVAL. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIET/ CUBANS WOULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN ANGOLA AND PERHAPS TO PROSECUTE THE CONTINING LIBERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. IN SOME OF THE FIRST SECRET DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THE MPLA HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE THE FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF ANGOLA, BUT AT THE CRUCIAL LAST MEETING IN BRAZZAVILLE, NETO INSISTED ON HIS VISION OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE. MOBUTU THUS GAVE SIGNIFICANT GROUND ON THIS POINT, BUT HE HAD LITTLE LEVERAGE TO DO OTHERWISE. HE DID NOT OFFER TO JOIN THE THE "BATTLE AGAINST THE RECIST OPPRESSORS"-- BUT HE DID NOT PROTEST AGAINST NETO'S PLANS EITHER.

8. MOBUTU HAD TO GIVE GROUND ON THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION TOO. WITH HIS OWN SINGLE PARTY, THE MPR, AND IN THE FACE OF MPLA DOMINANCE, HE WAS IN A POOR POSTION TO ARGUE THAT THE FNLA AND UNITA SHOULD PARTICIPATE AS POLITICAL PARTIES. IN EFFECT, MOBUTU WAS REDUCED TO ARGUING FOR A HUMANE AND BROAD RE-INTEGRATION OF EX-FNLA/UNITA MEMBERS INTO THE GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL LIFE. NETO, OF COURSE, COULD AND DID BUY THAT FORMULATION. ON THIS POINT-WHICH WAS THE FOUNDATION OF MOBUTU'S POLICY ON ANGOLA--MOBUTU ATE CROW.

9. ON THE "REAL" REFUGEES QUESTION, NETO AGREED TO TAKE THEM BACK, BUT PLEADED THAT HE HAD A WAR GOING ON IN THE SOUTH AND NO RESOURCES TO HANDLE A LARGE INFLUX. IT WAS AGRRD TO TURN THE PROBELM OVER TO THE JOINT COMMISSION AND TO THE UNHCR. HERE MOBUTU GOT PROMISES, BUT THAT IS ALL HE COULD REALLY EXPECT. NOW HE'LL TURN TO OTHERS FOR ASSITANCE. ON THE "CODE WORD" REFUGEES, WE HAVE ALREADY MENTION THE KATANGAN GENDARMES. AS FOR THE FNLA SOLDIERS AND MILITANTS, MOBUT GAVE NETO THE SAME ASSURANCE AS HE RECEIVED ON THE KATANGANS: THOSE WHO WISHED TO RETURN COULD; THOSE WHO STAYED WOULD BE CONTROLLED AND WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO NETO. DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT. IN OUR OPINION, THIS WAS THE MAJOR QUID MOBUTU WAS PREPARED TO OFFER FROM THE BEGINNING. NEVERTHELESS IT IS A SIGNIFICANT PULLBACK FROM HIS CONSISTENT POLICY OVER THE YEARS OF GIVING SUPPORT TO FNLA GOALS.

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10. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS? REFLECTING THE SHIFT IN THE OBJECTIVES, HE HAS NEUTRALIZED THE FNLA AND LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR NEUTRALIZING UNITA. HIS NEXT STEP WILL PROBABLY BE TO ATTEMPT A SIMILAR ACCOMMODATION WITH KANUNDA. HE HAS SECURED HIS NORTHERN AND ESTERN BORDERS FOR THE TIME BEING AND THUS WILL BE ABLE TO MOP UP THE SOUTH AND LEGITIMIZE SOVIET/ CUBAN INTERVENTION BY ENFOLDING IT INTO THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE. IN RETURN, HE TOOK THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ACCOMMODATION, SEALED THE DEAL WITH PROMISES AND GUARANTEES ON ZAIRE'S HISTORICAL AND KEY INTERESTS AND ACCEPTED MOBUTU'S NORMALIZATION-SHORT-OF-RECOGNITION FORMULA.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: RECOGNITION, AGREEMENTS, AMITY
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976KINSHA01874
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760080-1160
From: KINSHASA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197603100/aaaadkim.tel
Line Count: 180
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 MAR 2004 by MartinML>; APPROVED <04 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MOBUTU-NETO ACCOMODATION: A REVIEW OF MOTIVES AND RESULTS
TAGS: PFOR, CG, AO, MPLA, (MOBUTU SESE SEKO), (NETO, AGOSTINHO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006